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1. Introduction 
Thank you very much for having me, my name is Joanna Wilson and I am a Lecturer in                                   
Commercial Law at the University of Sussex. This paper that I am presenting today is                             
concerned with the extended history of the regulation of international banking and it                         
challenges the common perception that regulation in this area only began in 1974 when the                             
Basel Committee was formed and tasked with the promotion of stability in the global                           
financial system through, among other things, the placing of micro­prudential controls on the                         
activities of internationally active banks.  
 
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that it is only in recent years that banks have been subject to                                   
formal control at a global level this does not mean that the regulation of international banking                               
has not been characterised by some other form of governance throughout history.  
 
Accordingly, the hypothesis here is that the regulation of international banking is not a recent                             
occurrence and actually the international banking industry ​was subject to an alternative form                         
of governance in the pre­Basel era. This hypothesis was reached through an analysis of the                             
rationale that underpinned the formation of the Basel Committee itself in 1974 and the                           
introduction of controls being placed on banks at an international level. The motivation                         
behind this new form of governance was the rapid globalisation of financial services in the                             
post­war era, as well as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and                                 
the failure of two international banks, all of which raised concerns over the ongoing stability                             
of the international financial system. So it was the systemic risks created by the globalisation                             
of the banking industry and the resulting interconnected economic environment that                     
prompted these concerns leading to the introduction of controls being placed on banks at an                             
international level. 
 
However, and what is most important here, is the fact that international banking is not a                               
recent phenomenon and issues pertaining to the maintenance of stability in the global                         
economy that result from the systemic implications of having an interconnected financial                       
system have resonated throughout history.  
 
While the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which includes the ex­ante                           
regulation of the international banks themselves, encapsulates the contemporary method of                     
governing these issues, what this paper seeks to do, in light of the abovementioned fact that                               
international banking is not a recent phenomenon, is analyse the historical method of                         
governing them. In contrast with its modern counterpart, it is argued that the regulation of                             
international banking throughout history was characterised, not by the placing of formal                       
controls on the individual market participants, but by a form of self­regulation which hinged                           
on the informal cooperation of the international bankers themselves. This, I argue, is similar                           
is some respects to the club governance style of regulation which Michael Moran explains                           
ruled the financial landscape of the City of London itself up until the late 1970’s. 
 
So essentially what this paper is doing here is applying a domestic theory on regulation in an                                 
international context in an attempt to explain the extended history of the regulation of                           
international banking. 
  
 
2. Origins of International Banking 
So this paper is underpinned by the question of when international banking originated and                           
how it developed over time. To give you a very quick overview: 
 
International banking actually originated in the eighteenth century when merchants began to                       
turn their attention away from commerce, focusing instead on the provision of credit to                           
facilitate international trade. The eighteenth century had seen an explosion in international                       
commerce and it was the merchants who exploited the new opportunities that this created by                             
providing the means through which payments could be made. The method of payment used in                             
an international context was the bill of exchange and these merchant banks would provide a                             
guarantee for settlement of the bill upon its presentation to them. The role of these merchant                               
bankers as international financiers, both in the field of accepting bills of exchange, and also                             
in relation to the issuing of foreign loans, grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century                           
when the likes of Barings established themselves as the leading investors in American trade,                           
and Rothschild successfully spread their network of branches across Europe.  
 
The 1870s marked the beginning of a 50 year period of rapid globalisation, sparking                           
unprecedented growth in capital flows and trade which, combined with the expansion of                         
transportation and the enhancement of communication, facilitated the development of                   
international banking further. Accordingly, it was during this era that the global economy                         
became truly interconnected; the links between financial centres became stronger and the                       
gold standard was globalised, bringing stability to international monetary transactions. The                     
onset of war in 1914, which was followed by the Wall Street Crash in 1929, an ongoing state                                   
of depression in the 1930s and further conflict in the early 1940s, put a halt to this period of                                     
globalisation and led to the implosion of international financial activity across the globe.  
However, the post­war era saw the revival of the global economy and the evolution of                             
international banking through the introduction of capital markets such as the international                       
inter­bank market and the Eurodollar market which were fundamentally separate from the                       
earlier trade related economies on which international finance had been based. Stability was                         
restored as a result of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 and this facilitated the rapid                               
expansion of trade and international finance. However, when the Bretton Woods system of                         
monetary management came to an end in the 1970s, concerns were raised regarding the                           
stability of this newly energised international financial system and it was at this time that the                               
Basel Committee was formed, and international banks became subject to control. 
 
So although the international banking system that characterises the modern world is quite                         
unrecognisable when compared to the global nature of the industry from an historical                         
perspective, this does not mean that systemic issues were not raised under the previous trade                             
related international banking system. 
 
3. Regulation 
In terms of regulation then, the international nature of banking and the interconnectedness of                           
financial centres raise a series of implications and complications in terms of regulation and                           
the maintenance of international financial stability. For example, there is the concern that                         
because of the connection between financial markets, economic disturbances in one                     
jurisdiction can lead to instability in another, and there is the ‘too big to fail’ argument which                                 
centres around the premise that some banks have such systemic importance in terms of the                             
stability of international financial markets that they must be rescued in the event that they                             
face difficulty.  
These issues are not peculiar to the modern world. These issues did not occur only in the                                 
post­was era. For example, in 1890 Barings Bank­ which was probably the biggest bank in                             
the world at the time­ faced bankruptcy, and if it had been allowed to fail, not only would                                   
London’s status as the leading financial centre of the world been jeopardised, but also,                           
because of the extent to which Barings engaged in international transactions, it would have                           
undoubtedly caused wider financial disturbances across the globe.  
 
Now the cumulative effect of these types of issues in a modern context was that there was                                 
increasing pressure to adopt a formal international regulatory response in order to maintain                         
stability. Whilst much has been documented about this response in terms of the work of the                               
Basel Committee over the past 40 years, what this paper is concerned with is the way                               
international banking was regulated in the pre­Basel era. This is where the theory of club                             
governance comes into play.   
 
4. The theory of club governance 
Moran’s theory of club governance is analysed in his book ​The British Regulatory State:                           
High Modernism and Hyper Innovation ​and it essentially provides that in an historical sense,                           
the City of London is special in terms of its economy because of the self­regulatory style of                                 
governance that the financial services industry adopted. Accordingly, Moran argues that in                       
the pre 1970s era the banking sector was characterised by uncodified, unorganised and                         
unjuridified systems and in contrast, the period from the 1970s onwards, which represents the                           
modern age of regulation, saw the replacement of these informal systems with more formally                           
organised more elaborately codified and more legally bound state control systems. 
 
Moran argues that in this historical period, regulation was underpinned by the close personal                           
relationships of the bankers themselves and it existed only in the form of cultural restraints                             
and the subtle exercise of social controls conducted via the creation of club­like bodies such                             
as the Stock Exchange and the Accepting Houses Committee. He argues that the Bank of                             
England was the linchpin of this informal cooperative system, assuming the position of                         
central bank and prudential regulator. He summarises the regulatory environment by stating                       
that “By the beginning of the twentieth century, the culture of the City elites…fostered a style                               
of regulation that emphasized informality, collegiality, and cooperation.”  
 
Essentially then, Moran’s theory on the regulation of the financial services industry                       
throughout history, was that it revolved around the close, personal relationships of the                         
bankers themselves and the informal cooperative practices that they adopted in order to                         
maintain an efficient system and this behaviour was institutionalised through clubs and                       
organisations such as the Stock Exchange. 
 
5. Applying the Theory in an International Context: Its Limits and Utility  
There is no doubt that Moran’s account of the regulatory history of financial services                           
provides a valuable insight into the way the banking industry was governed in the UK in the                                 
pre 1970s era. However, the limitation of his theory is that it focuses only on the domestic                                 
dimension of the industry, emphasising the social and economic connection between the                       
bankers of London itself through club­like bodies and the informal pressure exerted by the                           
Bank of England as manager of the system. Accordingly, what Moran fails to take into                             
consideration is the international nature of the banking industry, the implications that this                         
raises in terms of governance, and whether any form of regulation took place in order to                               
maintain the global economy across national boundaries.  
Having said that, Moran’s explanation, even though only in a domestic context, is useful in                             
terms of aiding our understanding of what might have been happening at an international                           
level. Thus, the value of Moran’s theory is that it portrays ‘regulation’ as a much more fluid                                 
concept than the more rigid, rules based modern perception of the term. He provides a theory                               
of regulation that rests, not on the law or on a formal adoption of principles, but on the                                   
relationships between market participants, the informal cooperation that existed between                   
them and the subtle exercise of control they exerted upon one another. In particular, Moran                             
provides a useful comparison of the characteristics of the pre and post 1970s regulatory                           
environment and if we apply these characteristics in an international context it will be seen                             
that the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as the body concerned with                             
the regulation of the international banking industry in a modern context, clearly represents                         
this more formally organised, more elaborately codified and more legally bound system of                         
regulation. The question that this raises then is whether, in similar vein to Moran’s domestic                             
theory of regulation in the pre 1970s era, the international banking industry was ever subject                             
to a more informal approach to regulation.  
 
So did a form of ‘international club governance’ ever exist in the pre­Basel era? 
 
6. International club governance 
In analysing whether similar characteristics could be said to have featured in the governance                           
of the global economy, this paper argues that although not identical, the regulation of the                             
international banking industry throughout history did strike some similarities to Moran’s                     
domestic theory.  
 
In the pre­war era, this cooperative style of informal regulation focused on ex­post crisis                           
management where banks would come to the rescue of their counterparts across national                         
boundaries in times of financial distress. The paper gives several examples of this taking                           
place from the eighteenth century up until 1914. Using the Barings crisis of 1890 as an                               
example, the Bank of England, with reserves equally only half of Barings liabilities, was                           
unable to act as the sole lender of last resort and so, in order to strengthen their dubious                                   
position, they were able to beg a loan of £3 million from the Bank of France. This was                                   
orchestrated using the connection between Rothschild in London and his cousins in Paris who                           
in turn communicated with the Bank of France and was able to secure the loan. Now the                                 
Bank of France were amenable because of their acute awareness of the connection between                           
financial markets and the fact that had Barings Bank gone down, a dangerous monetary crisis                             
would have ensued in London, and this would no doubt have spilled onto the French market.                               
So what this transaction meant was that the central bank in London received a much needed                               
injection of liquidity and an international financial crisis was averted.  
 
There are many other instances similar to this that occurred throughout history and what this                             
paper argues is that this was the starting point in the governance of international banking­ this                               
was the way in which the global financial system was managed­ not through the placing of                               
controls on the banks themselves in order to bolster stability­ but through informal ad hoc                             
crisis management which often rested on the international business or familial connections                       
that existed between bankers across national boundaries and their desire to protect their                         
domestic financial system from the risk of contagion that arose because of the                         
interconnection between national economies.  
 
The paper argues that this behaviour developed along closer lines to Moran’s theory in the                             
inter­war period, particularly in the context of the institutionalisation of cooperation through                       
a club­like body that was analogous to an organisation such as the Stock Exchange in                             
London. One of the central characteristics of Moran’s notion of club governance was the role                             
of club­like bodies in forging the close personal relationships between bankers and                       
facilitating the collaborative practices that they engaged in. As Moran explains, it was                         
through clubs and institutions such as the Stock Exchange and the Accepting Houses                         
Committee that this informal system of management based on cooperation and collegiality                       
became institutionalised; it was these associations that provided the forum for bankers to                         
meet on an unofficial basis and govern the financial services industry through informal                         
collaboration. 
 
It is argued that it was that during the inter­war period that the first steps were taken towards                                   
the transformation of this international form of governance from a system based on informal                           
cooperative practices, to a more entrenched form of management; Firstly, bankers were                       
brought together at the inter­war conferences to discuss the future of central bank cooperation                           
directly. Secondly, central bankers began to develop personal relationships with one another,                       
the relationship between Montagu Norman of the Bank of England and Benjamin Strong of                           
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York being the most celebrated example of this, and this                               
suggests that the personal relationships that existed among the club like organisations of the                           
City of London itself were beginning to be emulated at an international level. Finally and                             
most importantly, the Bank for International Settlements was born which provided the ‘club’                         
through which the most powerful bankers in the world would meet and coordinate their                           
policies in order to maintain stability in the global economy. The informal monthly meetings                           
of the central bankers that took place there were the hallmark of this international system of                               
governance and the lender of last resort functions performed by the Bank, either on its own                               
account, or in providing the forum through which to arrange international consortiums, shows                         
how important the cooperative practices were at the institution in multilaterally stemming                       
international financial crises. So as well as providing the opportunity for central bankers to                           
meet, forge friendships and exchange information, all of which provided the foundation for                         
this club governance style of regulation, the BIS also enabled these bankers to pool their                             
resources and coordinate their actions when it came to the maintenance of stability on the                             
global economy through the rescue of other central banks. An example of this coordinated                           
action was the assistance offered by the Bank for International Settlements and its members                           
to the Austrian National Bank in the early 1930’s following the collapse of the monumental                             
Credit­Anstalt Bank. When this news was made public, the Austrian banks began to suffer                           
heavy withdrawals and so the Austrian National Bank sought international cooperation in                       
raising a standby credit in order to cover their own losses. Whereas ordinarily, the Austrian                             
National Bank would have relied on the cooperation of another central bank or group of                             
private banks in raising the necessary liquidity, Norman, Governor of the Bank of England                           
instead referred the Austrian authorities to the Bank for International Settlements,                     
highlighting that this international institution was now the appropriate forum to coordinate                       
such global action. As a result of this a loan of 100 million shillings was made available to                                   
the National Bank, 40 million of this being made available by the BIS itself and the                               
remaining 60 million being raised by eleven central banks through the agency of the BIS.  
 
This type of cooperative behaviour continued in the post­war era but by the early­mid 1970s,                             
international financial markets had been subject to a complex makeover, meaning that the                         
industry was exposed to new levels and types of risk and it was in this climate that the call for                                       
an appropriate regulatory response became more acute. From this pressure, the Basel                       
Committee on Banking Supervision was born, an international organisation formed by the                       
G10 regulators and central bank governors based at the BIS, which was designed to                           
coordinate financial affairs on a more systematic basis and harmonise regulatory standards                       
across the globe. 
 
Accordingly, the closing argument here is that the year of 1974 did not mark the beginning of                                 
the regulation of international banking but rather, it represented a shift away from a system of                               
governance that rested on the relationships between commercial and central bankers where                       
crisis management was dealt with on an informal ex­post basis, towards a system of                           
governance, still based at the ‘Basel Club’, but one that was more formal and systematic and                               
involved the ex­ante regulation of the banks themselves.  
 
 
 
 
